

China's Rise and the Security Architecture in East Asia

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I. Introduction


China not only claims the natural resources, but also eyes control of a part of the SLOC?

1. The PLA Navy's four big naval exercises
2. The Senkaku Islands
3. Four Islands Groups (the Pratas Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands)

II. The Chinese Interpretation of the International Law of the Sea


1. The East China Sea (Fig-1)

Source: Yomiuri Shinbun, 19 June 2008



2. The Gulf of Tonkin (Fig-2)


Source: Tan Jiaxuan, Jinyuxufeng, Shijiezhishi Chubangshe, 2009, p. 262, Author's Interview in Japan & Vietnam



The South China Sea

Fig-3: Four Islands Groups and the Broken U-shaped Line in the South China Sea

(Source: Hainansheng Quantu, Xinhua Shudian, 1988)



Japan's Senkaku Islands

Uotsurijima Island
(Photo: Koichi Sato)



Taishojima Island
(Photo: Koichi Sato)



Japan's Senkaku Islands

Kubajima Island
(Photo: Koichi Sato)

Kitakojima Island & Minamikojima
Island (Photo: Koichi Sato)



Spratly Islands: Malaysia's Swallow Reef

Artificial Island from Air: Airstrip
(Photo: Koichi Sato)



Artificial Island from Lagoon
(Photo: Koichi Sato)



Spratly Islands: Malaysia's Swallow Reef

Developing a Diving Resort
(Photo: Koichi Sato)



Malaysian Navy Base
(Photo: Koichi Sato)



III. The Chinese Naval Strategy (Fig-4, Source: the US Department of Defense)



IV. The PLA Navy's Capability

Table-1: Comparison of the Main Warships in the Asia-Pacific Region

	Crew (10000)	Submarine	Aircraft Carrier	Cruiser	Destroyer	Frigate	% of the gas-turbine	Total
U.S.A.	32.7	71	11	22	56	30	100(%)	191
Japan	4.6	16			45	8	75.5	69
China	24	54	(1)		27	49	9.2	131
Taiwan	3.15	4			4	22	46.1	26
ROK	3.5	14			10	9	52.6	19
DPRK	4.6	23(s55)				3	-	26
India	5.1	16	1		8	13	52.3	38
AUS	1.3	6				12	100	18
INDON	3.7	2				7	-	9
SINGA	0.45	4				6	0	10

(Source: *Sekai No Kaigun 2010-2011*, Kaijinsha Publishing, 2010, Tokyo)

China's High-Low Mixed Weaponry System

Kilo Class Diesel Submarine
(Photo: Joint Staff Office, JSDF)

Ming Class Diesel Submarine
(Photo: Joint Staff Office, JSDF)



Constructing Aircraft Carriers ?

**JMSDF's Helicopter Escort Ship:
Hyuga (Photo: Koichi Sato)**



**USS Independence's Steam
Catapults (Photo: Koichi Sato)**



V. The Security Architecture in East Asia: How to Respond to the China's Rise in Asian Waters

Two Pillars of Security Architecture in East Asia

1. ASEAN's Conference Diplomacy based on "ASEAN Way" → "ASEAN Regime"

ARF, ASEAN-China Summit, ASEAN+3 Summit, EAS, ADMM+8, Heads of Coast Guard Agencies Meeting ▪ ▪ ▪ CBMs, Code of Conduct?

Another ASEAN+3 (Japan, U.S., China) Summit ?


2. The U. S. led Military Alliance and Security Cooperation among the States in the Region

Exercises: Cobra Gold, CARAT, Pacific Reach

The Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Japanese Host Nation Support


Exercises under the FPDA

Spratly Islands: The Swallow Reef (artificial island)



Sources: Koichi SATO, Issues of Spratlys and Malaysia, *Toa*, No. 380, February 1999, p. 32

The Structure of ASEAN's Conference Diplomacy (2005)



* AUS: Australia, B: Brunei, CAMB: Cambodia, HK: Hong Kong, I: Indonesia, IND: India, M: Malaysia, MEXI: Mexico, MYAN: Myanmar, P: Philippines, PNG: Papua New Guinea (ASEAN observer), Russia (EAS: guest), S: Singapore, T: Thailand, V: Vietnam.

* APEC: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, EAS: East Asia Summit, Post Ministerial Conferences: Post Ministerial Conferences with Dialogue Partners (PMC) (©Koichi Sato)

Source: Koichi Sato, ASEAN Regime: Its Implications for East Asia Cooperation – A Japanese View, Tamio Nakamura ed., *The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective*, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, 2007, p. 22.

Memo (February 2011):

Security Cooperation between Japan and Europe

Michito Tsuruoka

Changing Context of Europe-Japan Security Cooperation

- Japan's and the EU's expanding political and security role resulted in a wider overlap of areas of activities and interests between the two (both are trying to raise political and security profile commensurate with economic prowess)
- Europeans becoming more aware of the security environment in Asia
- This is mainly because of (1) growing trade and economic relations with Asia and (2) the fact that the centre of gravity of world power is shifting to Asia
- At least to safeguard economic interests, Europeans now feel they need to pay more attention to Asia's security issues

How to Use Europe as a Security Partner: A Japanese View

- NATO as a partner: political partner, operational partner, cooperation with the US and a multilateral school
- The EU as a partner: political partner, operational partner, non-US partner
- Individual countries as a partner: the UK and France as Permanent Members of the UNSC, bilateral cooperation in multilateral contexts

Reality of Japan-Europe Security Cooperation

- While not widely recognised, practical operational (military-to-military) cooperation has already been taking place—refuelling operation in the Indian Ocean, cooperation in Iraq and 'de facto joint operation' in the Gulf of Aden for counter-piracy
- It has so far depended on bilateral arrangements between Japan and relevant individual countries in Europe—Japan-UK, Japan-Netherlands in the case of Iraq and Japan-France in the case of counter-piracy operations
- Lacking institutional/legal frameworks between Japan and the EU
- Security of Information Agreement between Japan and NATO (2010)

Challenges in Japan and the EU

- Challenges in Japan: underestimation of the EU, longstanding 'US-first' instinct in foreign and security policy, domestic political problems
- Challenges in the EU: consolidating the new structure under the Lisbon Treaty, lack of interest in Japan?
- In a broader Europe-Asia context—hurdles in the EU: difficulty of formulating a single voice vis-à-vis Asia, lack of clear ideas on its strategic interests in Asia

Agendas for Future Cooperation

- Managing the rise of China
- Maintaining maritime security

“Japanese Perspectives on Asian Security (Open Seminar)
Norwegian Institute of International Studies, Oslo (February 24, 2011)

Japan-U.S.-China Relations and Asian Security
Presentation Outline

Seiichiro Takagi
Aoyama Gakuin University

- I. Structure of the Japan-U.S.-China relations
 1. Shape of the triangle: Non-equilateral (Three different bilateral relationships)
 2. Japan-U.S.: Alliance
 - Broad-based cooperation centered around the security alliance
 - Asymmetry in the security arrangement: Bases for protection
 - Japan’s peculiar interpretation of the Constitutional constraints on collective self-defense (SIASJ, BMD)
 - U.S. nuclear umbrella (Extended deterrence)
 - Japan’s high host-nation support
 - Economic interdependence
 - Common values
 - Social ties and mutual cultural penetration: Pop culture, food
 - Sources of friction
 - Japan’s impulse for independence (+Asian pull)
 - U.S. frustration with free-riding
 - History: Pearl Harbor vs. Hiroshima/Nagasaki
 3. U.S.-China: Economic Interdependence with mutual strategic suspicion
 - Constant mixture of conflict and cooperation (fluctuations within a narrow range)
 - Co-existence of factors of cooperation and conflict with no stable pattern of dominance (Fundamental difference from the Cold War days)
 - Reasons for seeking cooperation (U.S.)
 - National security: Perm5, nuclear-weapon state, role in regional security
 - Economic: Export (BEM), import (low-cost manufactured goods), investment
 - Common responsibility: CO2 emission
 - Reasons for cooperation (China)
 - Security: “The sole superpower” (Danger of head-on confrontation)
 - Economic: Export market, investment, technology, human resource training
 - Peace and stability in the surrounding areas
 - Taiwan: Need to deny strategic utility (c.f. 1950s and 60s)
 - Factors of conflict (U.S.): reasons of frustration

- National security: China's reluctance to cooperate (North Korea), WMD proliferation (Pakistan, early 1990s)
- Economic prosperity: Trade imbalance, Yuan-\$ exchange rate, IPR
- Human rights and democratization: Continued suppression
- Factors of conflict (China)
 - "Hegemonism": Unilateralism, Imposition of own values
 - Self-centeredness: ad-hoc protectionism, "absolute security"
 - "Containment": Prevention of China's development
 - "Peaceful evolution"
 - Taiwan: Arms sale (encouragement of the pro-independence forces)
- Complication: Relevance of domestic political process
 - Constraint on flexibility ("kowtow" vs. "Traitor")
- Long-term trend: Power transition or Power shift
- Basic posture toward the other
 - U.S.: Engagement + Hedging
 - China: Avoidance of confrontation + Soft balancing
- 4. Japan-China: Close ties with lasting mutual uneasiness
 - Interdependence: Low likelihood of severe confrontation, frequency of frictions
 - Needs of positive relationship (In addition to economic, China)
 - Stability in the region
 - Environmental protection, energy conservation
 - Leverage against the U.S. pressure
 - East Asian cooperation (community building)
 - Needs of positive relationship (In addition to economic, Japan)
 - Regional stability (North Korea)
 - U.S. relations (when U.S.-C is positive)
 - Regional cooperation
 - U.N. reform
 - Constraints on cooperation (factors of conflict)
 - Values (Yasukuni, Tibet, Human rights)
 - Territorial demarcation (Senkaku Islands, EEZ in East China Sea)
 - Rivalry (East Asian Summit, Japan as a perm in UNSC)
 - Irritants: IPR (J), Food safety (J), Humiliation (C)
 - Constructive competition: FTA vs. CEPA

II. The Trilateral Dynamics

1. Two against one
2. China's triangular diplomacy
3. Three-way cooperation

III. Security issues in Asia and the Japan-U.S.-China relations

1. Recent developments: U.S.-Japan vs. China

1) The Korean peninsula

- (1) Cheonan Incident: Response to the investigation team's report
- (2) U.S.-RoK joint naval exercise
- (3) Chinese opposition to the initial plan (Yellow Sea, nuclear submarine)
Execution in the Sea of Japan

2) South China Sea

- (1) Chinese harassment and detention of South East Asian fishermen
- (2) Chinese hints that SCS is their "core national interest"
- (3) U.S. statement at the Hanoi ARF
 - Interest in the freedom of navigation and peace
 - Peaceful solution of the territorial dispute
- (4) Japanese support of the U.S.

3) The Senkaku incident

- (1) China's high-handed approach
- (2) Japanese "fear of abandonment"
- (3) Unequivocal U.S. assurance to J (Article 5 of JUSST)

4) The North Korean artillery attack on an ROK island

- (1) Chinese disagreement to the condemnation of North Korea
- (2) U.S.-RoK exercise with nuclear submarine in Yellow Sea
Chinese opposition ignored

5) Japan's National Defense Program Guideline

- (1) Concern with Chinese military development
- (2) Japan's own effort: "dynamic defense capability"
- (3) Reaffirmation of the JUSST

2. Taiwan

- 1) Recent positive cross-strait developments: ECFA (to military MCBM?)
- 2) Chinese concern (potential for J-U.S. vs. C)

- SIASJ in the J.-U.S. Defense Cooperation Guideline
- J.-U.S. Common Strategic Objective (2005)

3. Japan-U.S.-China cooperation?

- Six-party talks: success in 2005 but no follow-up

4. J.-U.S. vs China security dilemma?

- 1) Growing Concern with China's military development in J. and U.S.
- 2) Key issue: Chinese behavior
 - Transparency regarding their military development
 - Assertiveness
 - CBM, especially MMCM